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Filling the Texas Federal Court Vacancies
Carl Tobias*
Texas confronts many federal appellate and district court openings, but
the situation has reached crisis proportions. The state addresses two
protracted U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacancies, which
have lacked nominees for multiple years, and eleven open trial court seats,
all but one classified as "judicial emergencies." This conundrum persists,
although the Senate confirmed three jurists for Texas district vacancies in
both 2014 and 2015 and President Barack Obama submitted well qualified,
mainstream nominees on five empty posts in March 2016. Texas
Republican Senators John Comyn and Ted Cruz also failed to expeditiously
provide those designees' "blue slips," a necessary precondition for
Judiciary Committee arrangement of hearings. These candidates finally
received a September hearing, which proceeded smoothly, but the panel
never arranged a committee vote. Moreover, eight openings lacked
nominees throughout last year, while the Texas senators' processes that
marshaled candidates for administration consideration did not begin, or
were moribund, on a few in 2016, so that no more choices received
nomination that year. 2016 as well was a presidential election year when
confirmations traditionally slow or halt. These phenomena impose
detrimental effects, particularly related to justice's delivery. Because the
circumstances recently became desperate, they require scrutiny.
The piece first surveys the history of modem appointments
complications and the Texas vacancy crisis. It ascertains that expanding
caseloads, increasing appellate and district court judgeships, and rampant
partisanship have clearly undermined selection efforts across the country
and Texas, which is ground zero for the "confirmation wars." Because the
paper's analysis of the current situation detects that the nation and Texas
confront prolonged open slots, which erode prompt, inexpensive, and
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equitable case resolution, the last section proffers future suggestions,
mainly for President Donald Trump and the 115th Senate.
I. Modem Selection Difficulties
The background warrants limited discussion here, as the pertinent
history has been canvassed elsewhere,' while the present state of affairs is
most relevant. One essential notion is the persistent vacancies dilemma,
which resulted from enhanced federal court jurisdiction, dockets, and
judgeships.2 The other salient facet, the modem vacancy concern, is
political and can be ascribed to conflicting White House and Senate party
control which started thirty-five years ago.
A. Persistent Vacancies
Congress enlarged jurisdiction in the 1960s,3 criminalizing much
behavior and recognizing numerous causes of action, elements which
increased district court filings and concomitant appeals.4 Congress mainly
treated the rises by expanding judicial positions.5  Over the fifteen years
after 1980, confirmation times mounted.6  For instance, appellate
nominations consumed twelve months, confirmations consumed three
months, and both grew.7  Conditions acutely worsened later. For example,
circuit nominations devoured twenty months while appointments reached
six in 1997, the earliest year of Bill Clinton's last term, and 2001, the first
year of George W. Bush's commencing administration.
1. E.g., Gordon Bermant et al., Judicial Vacancies: An Examination of the Problem and
Possible Solutions, 14 MISS. C. L. REV. 319 (1994); MILLER CTR. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, IMPROVING
THE PROCESS FOR APPOINTING FEDERAL JUDGES: A REPORT OF THE MLLER CENTER
COMMISSION ON THE SELECTION OF FEDERAL JUDGES (1996).
2. The persistent vacancies complication deserves less assessment; delay is essentially
intrinsic, resists felicitous solution, and has been comprehensively analyzed elsewhere. Bermant
et al., supra note 1; Comm. on Fed. Courts, Remedying the Permanent Vacancy Problem in the
Federal Judiciary: The Problem of Judicial Vacancies and Its Causes, 42 REC. ASS'N B. CITY
N.Y. 374 (1987).
3. See MILLER CTR. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 3; Carl Tobias, The New Certiorari
and a National Study of the Federal Appeals Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1264, 1270 (1996).
4. E.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1796 (1994); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(1990).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 44 (2012); see S.1385, 113th Cong. (2013). See generally Archive ofJudicial
Vacancies, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-
judicial-vacancies [https://perna.cc/CX8R-HWA9].
6. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS
103 (1995).
7. See Bermant et al., supra note 1, at 329 (finding, between 1979 and 1992, the average
vacancy-to-nomination time to be 344 days and the average nomination-to-confirmation time to
be 75 days).
8. E.g., Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Confirmation Wars: Ideology and the Battle for the
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The process's many convoluted steps and number of participants make
some delay inevitable. 9 Presidents consult home state elected officials,
pursuing advice regarding submissions. Certain politicians deploy selection
panels that vet aspirants while suggesting competent applicants. The FBI
performs intensive "background checks." The ABA evaluates and rates
choices.' 0  The Justice Department might help screen aspirants while
preparing nominees for Senate review. The Judiciary Committee assesses
prospects, stages hearings for candidates and carefully discusses them, and
votes; those reported may have upper-chamber debates, when needed,
preceding floor ballots.
B. The Contemporary Dilemma
Article II intimates that senators might confine unwise administration
choices, while politics has suffused appointments." However, partisanship
cascaded when Richard Nixon vowed to enhance "law and order" by
designating "strict constructionists,"'2 growing prominently after U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Judge Robert Bork's
Supreme Court fracas.' 3 Politicization soared, while divided government
Federal Courts, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 871, 904-08 (2004); Orrin Hatch, The Constitution as the
Playbook for Judicial Selection, 32 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1035 (2009). Each of those years
resembled Obama's first year and his final two years.
9. Bermant et al., supra note 1; Sheldon Goldman, Obama and the Federal Judiciary: Great
Expectations But Will He Have a Dickens of a Time Living up to Them?, FORUM, no. 1, 2009, at
Article 9.
10. MILLER CTR. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, supra note 1; see ABA, STANDING COMM. ON FEDERAL
JUDICIARY: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS (1983); see also infra note 156 and accompanying
text (Trump Administration decision to eschew pre-nomination ABA evaluations and ratings).
11. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.E. Cooke ed., 1961); see
MICHAEL GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 28 (2000); SHELDON GOLDMAN,
PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 6
(1997).
12. GOLDMAN, supra note 11, at 198; DAVID O'BRIEN, JUDICIAL ROULETTE: REPORT OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY TASK FORCE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION 20 (1988). Trump, as presidential
candidate and President, has analogously pledged to increase law and order. Casey Quinlan,
Trump Signs Three New "Law and Order" Actions at Jeff Sessions' Swearing In, THINK
PROGRESS (Feb. 9, 2017), https://thinkprogress.org/jeff-sessions-swearing-in-95a9dl0204c5
[https://perma.cc/C5AS-5G9F]; Josh Zeitz, How Trump is Recycling Nixon s "Law and Order"
Playbook, POLITICO (July 18, 2016), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/07/donald-
trump-law-and-order-richard-nixon-crime-race-214066 [https://penna.cc/VXL2-Q6UL]; see
Yamiche Alcindor, Minorities Worry What a "Law and Order" Trump Presidency Will Mean,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/12/us/politics/minorities-worry-
what-a-law-and-order-donald-trump-presidency-will-mean.html [https://perna.cc/RTU8-FYWJ].
13. See JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT
18-20 (2007). For additional evaluation of Judge Bork's nomination and that confirmation
process's aftermath, see generally MARK GITENSTEIN, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE: AN INSIDER'S
ACCOUNT OF AMERICA'S REJECTION OF ROBERT BORK'S NOMINATION TO THE SUPREME COURT
(1992).
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and the hope that the party lacking the White House would capture it and
select jurists fostered procrastination.
Rather slow nominations may explain confirmations' dearth. In early
1997 and 2001, Clinton and Bush mustered relatively few circuit nominees
and opponents criticized some. 4 Politicians who tendered applicants often
stalled the pace.'" Bush's minimal consultation limited selection, 6 and
negligible GOP review of Clinton aspirants might have driven paybacks.' 7
The Judiciary Committee shared responsibility, because the panel slowly
analyzed, conducted hearings, and voted on people.' However, over 1997
and 2001, few candidates secured approval due to resource constraints and
politics, specifically ideological disagreements.1 9 Related pressing business
and unanimous consent, which allows one member to stop ballots,
prevented numerous chamber votes.20
C. Texas
Texas manifested both aspects of the national concern. For example,
swift population growth, instigated by a vibrant economy and mounting
immigration, exponentially increased district filings coupled with appeals;
14. Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Clinton Nominates 22 to
the Federal Bench (Jan. 7, 1997), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-1997-01-13/pdf/WCPD-
1997-01-13-Pg33.pdf [https://penna.cc/34C8-GF8C]; Remarks Announcing Nominations for the
Federal Judiciary, 37 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. DOC. 724 (May 9, 2001).
15. GOP senators demanded input, even sending names. Neil A. Lewis, Clinton Has Chance
to Shape the Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/09/us/clinton-
has-a-chance-to-shape-the-courts.html [https://perma.cc/X9F2-QMAW]; see 143 CONG. REC.
4,254 (Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Biden).
16. David L. Greene & Thomas Healy, Bush Sends Judge List to Senate, BALT. SUN (May 10,
2001), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2001-05-10/news/0 105100112 1 senate-democrats-
appeals-court-confirnation-process [https://penna.cc/39BS-E3HM]; see Elliot E. Slotnick,
Appellate Judicial Selection During the Bush Administration: Business as Usual or a Nuclear
Winter?, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 225, 234 (2006).
17. Paul A. Gigot, How Feinstein is Repaying Bush on Judges, WALL STREET J. (May 9,
2001), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB989369905566856183 [https://perna.cc/74MV-KPD7];
Neil A. Lewis, Party Leaders Clash in Capitol Over Pace of Filling Judgeships, N.Y. TIMES
(May 10, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/10/us/party-leaders-clash-in-capitol-over-pace-
of-filling-judgeships.html [https://perma.cc/S2EW-BQQ5].
18. Carl Tobias, Choosing Federal Judges in the Second Clinton Administration, 24
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 741, 742 (1997) (furnishing one circuit-nominee hearing every month
when Congress was in session); 143 CONG. REC. 4,254 (Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Biden)
(furnishing two circuit-nominee hearings a month across 1987-94).
19. Tobias, supra note 18, at 744; Neil A. Lewis, Bush and Democrats in Senate Trade Blame
for Judge Shortage, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/04/us/bush-
and-democrats-in-senate-trade-blame-for-judge-shortage.html [https://perna.cc/38MS-ZWA6].
20. Jennifer Bendery, Republicans Still Find Ways to Stall Judicial Nominees Despite
Filibuster Reform, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 10, 2014),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/08/republicans-judicial-nominees-n_4748528.html
[https://penna.cc/87DW-GWJ7]; infra note 84 and accompanying text.
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therefore, judgeships rapidly escalated to nine circuit and fifty-two district
seats. 21 Rising politicization correspondingly subverted the process by
stalling approvals.22 However, certain parameters ameliorated some
particular difficulties which suffuse the Texas appointments process. For
instance, Lloyd Bentsen (D) cooperated with Republicans John Tower and
Phil Gramm, who created a selection panel, and Ronald Reagan had a
chamber majority his first six years which promoted appointments, while
even once Democrats captured the Senate they astutely collaborated.23 Joe
Biden (D-Del.), who ably chaired the judiciary panel, attempted to confirm
all superb, consensus picks, and the chamber approved High Court Justice
Anthony Kennedy and six circuit jurists in 1988.24 Bush pare and his son
had many Texas contacts, who assisted with confirmation of judges, and
both knew quite a few prospects; the Texas senators appeared to
efficaciously predict openings, speedily proffering submissions, especially
over the Bush years.25 In Clinton's tenure, the GOP enjoyed a majority the
21. Judgeship legislation, which multiplied Texas judicial positions, witnesses these
propositions. E.g., Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629 (1978); Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990). I rely substantially here and
below on John Cornyn and Ted Cruz s Texas: A State of Judicial Emergency, ALLIANCE FOR
JUST. (Sept. 6, 2016), http://www.afj.org/our-work/issues/judicial-selection/texas-epicenter-of-
the-judicial-vacancy-crisis [https://penna.cc/G66C-V8L7]; Anisha Singh et al., Update: Texas,
Where Are the Judges?, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (May 5, 2016),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/civil-liberties/report/2016/05/05/136422/update-texas-
where-are-the-judges/ [https://perna.cc/G4G4-DGGJ]. The privacy needs of many candidates,
numerous Senate and House members, and the White House frustrate efforts to offer a complete
picture.
22. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text. Politicization was gradual, worsening
significantly after Bork. Nonetheless, even later, cooperation occurred. See infra notes 23-27 and
accompanying text; see also CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE
74-77 (2006).
23. 143 CONG. REC. 4,254 (Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Biden); see GOLDMAN, supra
note 11, at285.
24. Bork was an exception. See GITENSTEIN, supra note 13; TOOBIN, supra note 13, at 18.
When Reagan left office, Texas had three Fifth Circuit (one a newly created post) and two (1988)
district vacancies. Archive ofJudicial Vacancies: Year 1988, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/
judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/1988 [https://penna.cc/AQD4-
HPJE].
25. Each Bush named many state court judges. Biden cooperated with pere; when George
H.W. Bush left office, Texas had three Fifth Circuit (one created 1990), and ten district (seven
created 1990), vacancies. Archive of Judicial Vacancies: Year 1992, U.S. CTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/1992
[https://perma.cc/YH5Q-6AMG]. When Bush left office, Texas had one (2008) district vacancy.
Archive of Judicial Vacancies: Year 2008, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-
judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2008 [https://penna.cc/A9T5-QHAD];
see John Council, Bench Scouts: Texas Impressed by Quality of Candidates Vetted by Senator 's
Committee, TEX. LAW., Oct. 8, 2001, at 1; Natalie Knight, Texas Judicial Vacancy Flood Aeans
Cornyn, Cruz Aust Act, STAR-TELEGRAM (Aug. 26, 2015), http://www.star-
telegram.com/opinion/opn-columns-blogs/other-voices/article32481486.html [https://perma.cc/
5F4Q-NEZG].
[Vol. 95:170174
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last term and a half, while his predisposition to send very capable, moderate
nominees and compromise-and the Texas lawmakers' coordination-
allowed the process to function comparatively well. 26
In short, appointments were recently checkered, although a few
periods have yielded rather successful confirmation endeavors. Illustrations
were the Bush presidencies, even though the situation gradually worsened
after Bork's perilous fight until 2009, when it deteriorated.2 7
II. Obama Administration Judicial Selection
A. Obama's First Six Years
Selection performed relatively well in Obama's first six years when
Democrats possessed a chamber majority. He aggressively consulted
home-state elected officers, particularly Republicans, seeking, and normally
following, proposals of superior, mainstream, diverse nominees. 28  These
efforts promoted cooperation, as legislators in states having vacancies
receive deference because they can halt the process through retaining blue
slips. 2 9 Even with assiduous cultivation of the political actors, many have
not in fact cooperated, declining to expeditiously suggest accomplished,
consensus people.30
The GOP actually collaborated with routine hearings yet "held over"
discussions and committee votes a week for all but one in sixty-plus strong,
moderate circuit prospects. 31 Republicans slowly agreed on picks' chamber
debates, when necessary, and ballots, relegating superb centrists to languish
across weeks until Democrats pursued cloture.32  The GOP also sought
26. When Clinton left office, Texas experienced four district vacancies (two posts created
Dec. 2000). Archive of Judicial Vacancies: Year 2000, U.S. CTs., http://www.uscourts.gov/
judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2000 [https://perna.cc/ERU2-
FEBF]; see John Council, Frost Aims to Fill Vacancies Despite Lame Duck Clinton, TEX. LAW.,
Jan. 18, 1999, at 8.
27. See supra notes 13, 22, 25 and accompanying text; see also GEYH, supra note 22.
28. Carl Tobias, Senate Gridlock and Federal Judicial Selection, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
2233, 2239-40, 2253 (2013); see Sheldon Goldman, Elliot Slotnick & Sara Schiavoni, Obama's
First Term Judiciary, JUDICATURE, July-Aug. 2013, at 7, 8-17.
29. Goldman et al., supra note 28, at 16-18; Ryan Owens et al., Ideology, Qualifications, and
Covert Senate Obstruction of Federal Court Nominations, 2014 U. ILL. L. REv. 347; Tobias,
supra note 28, at 2242.
30. Some politicians recommended few or none. Goldman et al., supra note 28, at 17;
ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 21.
31. S. Judiciary Comm., Results of Exec. Business Atg. (Mar. 22, 2013); see Tobias, supra
note 28, at 2242-43.
32. Goldman et al., supra note 28, at 26-29; Tobias, supra note 28, at 2243-46; Matthew
Yglesias, Hillary Clinton Will Likely Have a Unique Chance to Remake the Federal Judiciary,
Vox (Aug. 22, 2016), http://www.vox.com/2016/8/22/12550852/hillary-clinton-lower-courts
[https://perna.cc/HK3T-8N4W].
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plentiful roll call votes and debate time for competent, mainstream
aspirants, who easily captured approval, thus consuming scarce floor
hours.33 Those ideas roiled appointments, leaving ninety court openings for
practically a half-decade after September 2009.34 In the 2012 presidential
election year, these Republican strategies grew; delay persisted while the
last circuit approval came that June.3 5
Texas selection yielded mixed results in Obama's first term, as
contrasted with Bush.3 6  In 2009, disputes arose over who enjoyed lead
responsibility to furnish the Obama Administration names. 37 Kay Bailey
Hutchison and John Comyn asserted their prerogatives, while the
Democratic House contingent argued that it would be responsible. Obama
favored House members, yet the senators kept affording persons whom the
Federal Judicial Evaluation Commission (FJEC) initially vetted.38  Those
disagreements, the entity's slow activation, and its rather dilatory pace
when soliciting picks, examining and interviewing candidates and tendering
recommendations combined with senators' delay when reviewing proposals
and sending choices frustrated nominations. These dilemmas were
exacerbated, as the House basically replicated this process. Differences
over candidates within the House complement, and between it and the
33. Tobias, supra note 28, at 2244; see Seung Min Kim, McConnell's Historic Judge
Blockade, POLITICO (July 14, 2016), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/mitch-mcconnell-
judges-225455 [https://perma.cc/778J-Q8BY].
34. See Goldman et al., supra note 28, at 13. See generally Archive of Judicial Vacancies,
supra note 5.
35. Archive of Judicial Vacancies: Year 2012, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-
judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/20 12 [https://perna.cc/QGY3-FKG9];
see Tobias, supra note 28, at 2246.
36. John Council, Why Texas Has a Serious Judicial Vacancy Problem, TEX. LAW. (Sept. 12,
2016), http://www.texaslawyer.com/id=1202767287264/Why-Texas-Has-a-Serious-Judicial-
Vacancy-Problem?slreturn=20160819162501 [https://perna.cc/4JL7-BVSJ]; Knight, supra note
25; Gary Martin, Vacancies, Backlogs Plague Federal Judiciary, HOUS. CHRON. (Mar. 2, 2013),
http://www.chron.com/news/politics/article/Vacancies-backlogs-plague-federal-judiciary-
4321484.php [https://perma.cc/QW8T-QHZS]. For contrast to Bush, see also infra note 45 and
accompanying text.
37. John Council, It Takes Two to Two-Step: Texas Dems & GOP Submit Dueling
Recommendations for Judgeships, TEX. LAW. (Oct. 15, 2009), http://www.texaslawyer.com/id=
1202484498738/It-Takes-Two-to-TwoStep-Texas-Dems--GOP-Submit-Dueling-
Recommendations-for-Judgeships [https://perna.cc/X8PD-2NG2]; Gary Martin, Judicial
Vacancies Burden Courts, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (May 1, 2010),
http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/localnews/article/Judicial-vacancies-burden-courts-
795544.php [https://penna.cc/8T3Y-LXJ2].
38. E.g., John Council, Judging Would-Be Judges: Head of Federal Judicial Evaluation
Committee Talks Qualifications, Vacancies and the 5th Circuit, TEX. LAW. (May 6, 2013),
http://www.texaslawyer.com/id=1202598550240/Judging-WouldBe-Judges [https://penna.cc/
XYQ4-PRHA]; Jessica M. Karmasek, Aembers of Texas Judicial Evaluation Committee
Announced, LEGAL NEWSLINE (Apr. 17, 2013), http://legalnewsline.com/stories/510515096-
members-of-texas-judicial-evaluation-committee-announced [https://penna.cc/49R5-LPH2].
[Vol. 95:170176
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senators, complicated endeavors. When they reached agreement, Obama
may have not.
Despite those machinations, Texas politicians concurred respecting
several able, consensus, diverse persons whom they recommended to
Obama and whom he nominated for district openings. Illustrative were
Gregg Costa, Marina Garcia Marmolejo and Diana Saldafia, who promptly
captured appointment.39 However, Texas' numerous judgeships meant that
vacancies frequently resulted, which nullified efforts to compensate for the
stalled beginning. Thus, although the Democratic chamber majority's
initiatives left no vacancies at Obama's election, unfilled trial court posts
rose to seven in his first administration but comprised five at the
conclusion.40 Finally, Hutchison decided to retire and quit proffering
selections upon her term's end in 2012, which delayed the process
somewhat.
With Obama's reelection, Democrats hoped for greater cooperation,
which failed to materialize, and resistance soared the next year when he
picked three exceptional, moderate, diverse nominees for the D.C. Circuit,
the second most important American tribunal. 4 2  The GOP restricted floor
votes; protracted obstruction led Democrats to explode the "nuclear option"
which limited filibusters.43
Texas selection over 2013-14 mirrored appointments in the nation then
and in the state during the prior four years. Ted Cruz's election in
November 2012 and Senate Judiciary Committee membership accorded
Texas powerful representation, yet Comyn and he negligibly coordinated
across the 113th Senate; Comyn insisted the President must nominate
before the Senate moves, and Cruz asserted that the Constitution permits
39. 158 CONG. REC. S2,761 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 2012); 157 CONG. REC. S6,058 (daily ed. Oct.
3, 2011); 157 CONG. REC. S619 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2011); Guillermo Contreras, Another Federal
Judge May Go, SAN ANTONIO ExPRESS-NEWS (Dec. 1, 2013),
http://www.expressnews.com/news/local/article/Another-federal-judge-may-go-5026374.php
[https://perma.cc/D9FR-ZBHN].
40. Archive ofJudicial Vacancies, supra note 5.
41. Carl Tobias, Judicial Vacancies in Texas Undercut Delivery ofJustice, THE HILL (Sept. 7,
2012), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/248183-judicial-vacancies-in-texas-undercut
-delivery-of-justice [https://perma.cc/6TZ4-WDFP].
42. Carl Tobias, Filling the D.C. Circuit Vacancies, 91 IND. L. J. 121 (2015); Jeffrey Toobin,
The Obama Brief NEW YORKER (Oct. 27, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2014/10/27/obama-brief [https://penna.cc/DJ9H-X2VX]; Yglesias, supra note 32.
43. On a majority vote, cloture changed from sixty votes to a majority for lower court
nominees. 159 CONG. REC. S8,418 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 2013). The Senate Republican majority
recently instituted an identical change for Supreme Court nominees. 163 CONG. REC. S2,390
(daily ed. Apr. 6, 2017); see Matt Flegenheimer, Republicans Gut Filibuster Rule to Lift Gorsuch,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-
supreme-court-senate.html [https://perma.cc/3HWJ-MCQG].
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GOP leaders to stymie nominees as a check on executive power.
Moreover, once vacancies surfaced, the politicians never initiated the FJEC
while jurists held active status, even when they gave much notice,
imploring the legislators to proceed, and though Cornyn did so with every
Bush aspirant.5  This meant the present circuit openings lacked nominees,
but in 2014 the Federal Judicial Evaluation Commission and lawmakers
recommended Judge Costa's elevation and Obama concurred, while he
secured quick approval. 6  A few talented, centrist district prospects also
were confirmed, yet as that year closed Texas had seven open positions.
The Senate failed to appoint three fine jurists until 2014 concluded or any
nominee the two years post-spring 2012.
B. Obama's Last Two Years
When the GOP won a majority on November 4, 2014, certain
observers were cautiously optimistic, because it diligently promised to
establish "regular order." 4 9 After succeeding,o leaders pledged to duly
44. Benched! Cornyn Passes the Buck on Rising Vacancy Numbers, ALLIANCE FOR JUST.
(Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.afj.org/blog/benched-cornyn-passes-the-buck-on-rising-vacancy-
numbers [https://perma.cc/FN3H-5MFB]; Benched! Knowing the Constitution, ALLIANCE FOR
JUST. (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.afj.org/blog/benched-knowing-the-constitution
[https://perma.cc/M69S-8XLF]; Ted Cruz, Obama is Not a Monarch, POLITICO (Nov. 19, 2014),
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/11/president-obama-is-not-a-monarch-113028
[https://perma.cc/NP3F-SDM9]. Cornyn and Cruz, as former Texas Supreme Court Justice and
Solicitor General, surely have a clearer grasp of the Constitution and the federal judicial selection
process than these ideas suggest. Only Texas and Utah have two GOP Judiciary Committee
members. Committee Members, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY (2016),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/about/members [https://perna.cc/VZ9T-UUK2].
45. ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 21; John Council, Exclusive: Eastern District Chief
Judge to Retire, TEX. LAW. (June 17, 2014), http://www.texaslawyer.com/id=1202659712641
/Exclusive-Eastern-District-Chief-Judge-to-Retire [https://penna.cc/RV62-WXSW]. They
worked little with House members or Obama, who aggressively consulted. Goldman et al., supra
note 28, at 16; see Jennifer Bendery, Here's a Look at the Most Ridiculously Long Judicial
Vacancies the Senate Still Hasn't Filled, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 12, 2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/10/obama-judicial-nominees-n_7042996.html
[https://penna.cc/AA9S-4PEH].
46. 160 CONG. REC. S3,175 (daily ed. May 20, 2014); Contreras, supra note 39.
47. Archive of Judicial Vacancies: Year 2014, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-
judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/20 14 [https://perna.cc/JW84-8FR2].
48. 160 CONG. REC. S6,907-08 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 2014); Michael Grunwald, Did Obama
Win the Judicial Wars?, POLITICO (Aug. 8, 2016), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/obama-
courts-judicial-legacy-226741 [https://perna.cc/ABL5-NLKP]; Jeremy W. Peters, White House
Steps Up Effort to Confirm Federal Judges, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com
/2014/04/29/us/white-house-steps-up-effort-to-confirn-federal-judges.html?_r-0 [https://perma.
cc/D6Z5-W28F].
49. E.g., Sarah Binder, Can Mitch McConnell Repair the Senate?, WASH. POST (Nov. 12,
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/11/12/can-mitch-
mcconnell-repair-the-senate/ [https://perna.cc/5U8S-SWC4].
50. Jerry Markon et al., Republicans Win Senate Control as Polls Show Dissatisfaction with
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reemploy this order" by invoking the standard procedures that were
ostensibly used before Democrats rejected those mechanisms. On the 114th
Congress' first business day, Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), the new Majority
Leader, posited "[w]e need to return to regular order" and has dutifully
repeated this mantra since.5 2 Chuck Grassley (R-lowa), the Judiciary chair,
analogously vowed to follow that order when the committee processed
nominees. 53  Comyn, the Assistant Majority Leader, echoed these
sentiments in chamber exchanges and committee deliberations. However,
regular order's application to a preeminent constitutional duty, advise and
consent on presidential nominees, 5 had minuscule impact.
1. District Court Process.-Obama assertively consulted and sought
proposals from home state elected officials regarding prominent, consensus
selections and usually capitalized on their advice by nominating the
candidates. 6  These practices aided confirmations, as lawmakers defer to
colleagues from geographic areas with empty seats because they frequently
veto picks through blue slip retention.5 7  Despite insistent cultivation of
many politicians, a number minimally assisted by slowly effectuating
581
procedures or recommending no one.
Texas is the consummate example. The jurisdiction suffers the most
immense vacancies, notwithstanding approval of three capable moderates in
Obama, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-control-at-
stake-in-todays-midterm-elections/20 14/1 1/04/e882353e-642c-1 1e4-bbl4-4cfeale742d5_story.
html [https://penna.cc/JS6L-UEE2]; Jonathan Weisman & Ashley Parker, Riding Wave of
Discontent, G.O.P. Takes Senate, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014
/11/05/us/politics/midtern-elections.html [https://perma.cc/P5YG-8C5E].
51. E.g., Binder, supra note 49; Jennifer Steinhauer & Jonathan Weisman, N.S.A. and Other
Aatters Leave McConnell 's Senate in Disarray, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.
comI/2015/05/24/us/politics/nsa-and-other-matters-vex-senate-leader-and-leave-disarray.html
[https://perma.cc/7UNM-MRCW].
52. 161 CONG. REC. S28 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 2015); 161 CONG. REC. S133 (daily ed. Jan. 12,
2015); 161 CONG. REC. S2,767 (daily ed. May 12, 2015). But see 161 CONG. REC. S2,949 (daily
ed. May 18, 2015); 161 CONG. REC. S3,223 (daily ed. May 21, 2015).
53. S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees (Jan. 21, 2015).
54. S. Judiciary Comm., Results ofExec. Business Aftg. (Feb. 26, 2015).
55. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see infra note 76 and accompanying text.
56. See Andrew Cohen, How to Secede From the Union, One Judicial Vacancy at a Time,
ATLANTIC (Apr. 8, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/arcive/2014/04/how-to-secede-
from-the-union-one-judicial-vacancy-at-a-time/360207/ [https://perma.cc/J5RJ-7BXR].
57. See Goldman et al., supra note 28, at 16-18; Owens et al., supra note 29; Tobias, supra
note 28, at 2242.
58. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. At 2015's end, 35 of 39 (19 of 21 emergency)
vacancies without nominees were in states with at least one GOP member. Archive of Judicial
Vacancies: Year 2015, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/
archive-judicial-vacancies/2015 [https://perna.cc/V23L-DQZH]. The Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts, the federal courts' administrative arm, bases emergencies on docket size and
vacancy length.
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both 2015 and 2016.59 The state has eleven trial court openings, all but one
categorized as emergencies.o In the April 13, 2015 chamber debate on the
first Texas re-nominee from 2014, Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) discerned "no
good" reason why 200 days were required for votes on two pending
selections.6 1 He elaborated that Texas had more than double any state's
vacancies, and urged its politicians to help the Senate quickly receive
prospects for every opening.6 2 This situation partly derived from slow
treatment of current vacancies, inability to predict new ones, the similarly-
extended FJEC pace, and conflicts over recommendations among the House
cohort and between them and each senator.63
Grassley convened the first hearing on January 21, promising to assess
talented, mainstream choices in regular order, alleging that citizens should
find no "discernible difference" between how the panel operates with
Republican leadership, 5 and suggesting that he would mount hearings
every few weeks that Congress worked. Differences promptly arose,
however. For instance, the next hearing came seven weeks past the first, the
third eight weeks later, and the fourth on June 10.67 The March session had
two nominees while June possessed three, a substantial contrast to the five
whom Leahy routinely processed as chair.
59. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
60. Archive of Judicial Vacancies: Year 2016, U.S. CTs., http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-
judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/20 16 [https://perna.cc/232C-VNET].
61. He was then the Judiciary Committee Ranking Member. 161 CONG. REC. S2,104 (daily
ed. Apr. 13, 2015).
62. Id.
63. John Council, Federal Judge Retirements Hit Texas Hard, TEX. LAW. (Feb 5, 2016),
http://www.texaslawyer.com/id=1202748966735/Federal-Judge-Retirements-Hit-Texas-Hard
[https://penna.cc/8LAE-9BNC]; Knight, supra note 25. But see Sylvan Lane, Senate Fills South
Texas Judgeship; First Confirmation Since GOP Takeover, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Apr. 13,
2015), http://trailblazersblog.dallasnews.com/2015/04/senate-fills-south-texas-judgeship-first-
confinnation-since-gop-takeover.html/ [https://penna.cc/84ZS-CLJJ].
64. S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees (Jan. 21, 2015); Jennifer Jacobs, Grassley's
Checklist of Priorities, DES MOINES REG. (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/
story/news/politics/2015/01/07/grassley-checklist-priorities-judiciary-cominittee/21394233/
[https://perma.cc/MZ2E-VLN2].
65. David Catanese, Chuck Grassley's Gavel Year, U.S. NEWS (Jan. 28, 2015),
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/01/28/chuck-grassleys-gavel-year [https://penna.cc/
7LX8-HG5E].
66. Grassley, as the Ranking Member, cooperated with Leahy, as the Chair, in 2011-2014.
Compare S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees (Jan. 21, 2015), with S. Judiciary Comm.,
Hearing on Nominees (Jan. 8, 2014) (statement of Sen. Grassley), and S. Judiciary Comm.,
Hearing on Nominees (Jan. 28, 2014) (statement of Sen. Grassley). See S. Judiciary Comm.,
Hearings on Nominees (Jan. 23, 2013) (statement of Sen. Leahy); S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing
on Nominees (Feb. 13, 2013) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
67. S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees (Mar. 11, 2015); S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing
on Nominees (May 6, 2015); S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees (June 10, 2015).
68. Compare S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees (June 10, 2015), and S. Judiciary
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In the April 20 debate on the second Texas re-nominee, Grassley
explicitly claimed that the GOP was moving at a pace like Democrats had
over 2007, while it was treating Obama "nominees extremely fairly." 69
Harry Reid (D-Nev.) stated that the panel staged very few hearings.70
Despite Grassley's pledges, he held over votes from the February 12
meeting,7 1 which continued a regime automatically deployed in Obama's
initial six years.72 2015 examples were four centrist trial level re-nominees
whom GOP panel members favored. 73  Grassley also did not conduct
meetings nearly all weeks that the 114th Congress operated.74
The Majority Leader slowly noticed debates and chamber ballots on
the four re-nominees. A month after panel reports, he decided to convene
one on April 13. This seemed a response to Leahy's idea that voting on no
judges was "contrary to historical precedent," and it sharply contrasted with
how Democrats treated Bush, especially in 2007-08 when the party
approved ten circuit and fifty-eight district judges. Leahy contended that
senators must proffer advice and consent during Obama's last two years
while authorizing seventy-three posts which the Judicial Conference
suggested for providing the resources that would enable the bench to deliver
justice. 6 He rejected Grassley's view that eleven nominees approved in the
Comm., Hearing on Nominees (Mar. 11, 2015), with S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees
(Sept. 9, 2014), and S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees (Jan. 21, 2015).
69. Compared to 273 for Bush at a similar time, 309 were approved. 161 CONG. REC. S2,263
(daily ed. Apr. 20, 2015). Leahy showed that the best yardsticks for measuring successful judicial
appointments are the fair treatment of federal court litigants and judges and the number of
nominees whom the Senate confirms.
70. He was the Senate Minority Leader. 161 CONG. REC. S3,850 (daily ed. June 8, 2015)
(comparing eighteen 2007 and four 2016 approvals at comparable time periods).
71. S. Judiciary Comm., Results ofExec. Business Atg. (Feb. 26, 2015); S. Judiciary Comm.,
Exec. Business Aftg. (Feb. 12, 2015).
72. E.g., S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Atg. (Sept. 11, 2014) (statement of Sen.
Grassley); S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Aftg. (Nov. 13, 2014) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
See Tobias, supra note 28, at 2242-43. Indeed, the GOP had not held over 19 of 360 Obama
nominees. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
73. Three were for Texas. Cornyn, Cruz, as well as Orrin Hatch and Mike Lee of Utah are
home-state members. S. Judiciary Comm., Results of Exec. Business Atg. (Feb. 26, 2015)
(approval votes).
74. Leahy convened meetings practically all weeks that Congress worked. E.g., S. Judiciary
Comm., Exec. Business Atg. (Mar. 27, 2014); S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Atg. (Apr. 3,
2014); S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Atg. (Apr. 8, 2014); S. Judiciary Comm., Exec.
Business Atg. (June 12, 2014); S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Atg. (June 19, 2014); S.
Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Atg. (June 26, 2014). Some weeks Grassley seemingly lacked
nominees or bills for panel members to consider.
75. 161 CONG. REc. S2,029 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 2015); see 161 CONG. REC. S2,104 (daily ed.
Apr. 13, 2015).
76. 161 CONG. REC. S2,029 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 2015); see supra note 55. The Judicial
Conference is the federal court policymaking arm. The Conference premises judgeship
recommendations on conservative work and case load estimates which it premises on empirical
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2014 lame duck session must count against 2015 by finding earlier
Congresses "always confirmed consensus nominees prior to long
"77recesses.
McConnell failed to state publicly when the other three nominees
would have ballots, yet he conducted one on April 20, sparking Leahy's
claim that the pace was harming tribunals and the nation. 8 When the
Majority Leader kept denying votes on the last two, Reid insisted
emergencies had doubled across 2015.79 Once his notions were ignored,
Reid criticized Texas's seven "emergencies, the most" nationally, and
Cornyn's inability to provoke Senate action despite pledges of rapid
consideration. 0 Those salvos apparently led McConnell to notice chamber
ballots ahead of the Memorial Day recess on both choices the panel had
approved nearly twelve weeks earlier.si Leahy used their debate to
castigate 2015 selection, proclaiming the Texan would fill one in six
emergencies in eight open positions.82  The Majority Leader slowly
instituted confirmation votes for every nominee reported in Obama's last
two years, averaging fewer than one per month.83 When Charles Schumer
(D-N.Y.) argued for July 30 unanimous consent on three fine picks,
Grassley objected that 2015 consideration was like 2007.4 Ten district
data. U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS 18-19 (Mar. 10, 2015); see U.S.
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS 16-17 (Mar. 14, 2017) (providing the most
recent recommendations).
77. 161 CONG. REC. S2,029 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 2015). Concerted Republican obstruction
finally forced Democrats to unleash the nuclear option; obstruction left almost 90 vacancies over
much of Obama's first five years. See Goldman et al., supra note 28, at 13 (consensus nominees'
approval); 161 CONG. REC. S3,224 (daily ed. May 21, 2015) (Grassley claim). See generally
Archive ofJudicial Vacancies, supra note 5.
78. Grassley said that eleven approvals in the 2014 lame duck session violated regular order,
so that adding them equalized the judicial confirmation processes in 2015 and 2007. 161 CONG.
REC. S3,224 (daily ed. May 21, 2015) (Grassley claim).
79. 161 CONG. REC. S2,659 (daily ed. May 6, 2015) (reiterating Leahy's ideas, supra notes
77-78).
80. 161 CONG. REC. S2,949 (daily ed. May 18, 2015); see S. Judiciary Comm., Results of
Exec. Business Aftg. (Feb. 26, 2015).
81. They filled emergencies. 161 CONG. REC. S3,224 (daily ed. May 21, 2015) (approving Jill
Parrish and Jose Rolando Olvera).
82. He criticized GOP excuses, which miss the larger picture of Republicans' responsibility to
grant advice and consent on presidential nominees. 161 CONG. REC. S3,223 (daily ed. May 21,
2015).
83. See generally the archives for years 2015 and 2016 in Archive of Judicial Vacancies,
supra note 5.
84. Grassley instructed Schumer to "put that in [his] pipe and smoke it." 161 CONG. REC.
S6,151-52 (daily ed. July 30, 2015); see supra notes 69, 78. Cornyn echoed Grassley's 2007/2015
trope. 161 CONG. REC. S6,793 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2015). Republicans granted no other 2016
Democratic requests for unanimous consent. See, e.g., 162 CONG. REC. S2,654 (daily ed. May 10,
2016); 162 CONG. REC. S4,870 (daily ed. July 7, 2016); 162 CONG. REC. S5,045 (daily ed. July
13, 2016); 162 CONG. REC. S5,312 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 2016); 162 CONG. REC. S5,900 (daily ed.
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815jurists won final ballots in 2015 and eight last year.
2. Circuit Court Process.-Circuit appointments warrant
comparatively little treatment, as the Senate confirmed one possibility in
2015 to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit with a second in
January 2016 for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The
Texas vacancies have persistently lacked nominees over sixty-one and
forty-four months. That is emblematic, because no reason justifies infinite
delay, which felicitously mustering Costa's elevation aptly shows.
In November 2014, Obama proposed Kara Farnandez Stoll, an
experienced practitioner, for the Federal Circuit and District Judge Luis
Felipe Restrepo, a talented, centrist jurist, for the Third."6 In March 2015,
Stoll had a hearing that progressed well 7 but only earned April committee
approval, languishing weeks on the floor." That June, McConnell
suggested the GOP could permit final votes on no more Obama appeals
court selections.89 When the press stated this, his aide indicated that the
Senate would "continue to do judges . . . [and probably] have a circuit
nominee."90 On June 8, Reid invoked McConnell's 2008 demands for
speedy review of Bush appellate prospects, denoting the body had yet to
confirm any jurist, "not even a consensus nominee such as Kara Stoll." 91
Leahy then argued for prompt treatment, which seemed to promote her July
ballot.92
Restrepo compellingly illuminates delay. The accomplished,
Sept. 20, 2016).
85. See generally Archive of Judicial Vacancies, supra note 5. All of Leahy's ideas deflate
the regular order mantra articulated by numerous Republican senators, especially Senators
McConnell and Grassley.
86. Both lacked 2014 hearings because Obama nominated them in November. Press Release,
White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Obama Nominates Two to Serve on the United
States Courts of Appeals (Nov. 12, 2014); Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec'y,
Presidential Nominations Sent to the Senate (Jan. 7, 2015).
87. S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees (Mar. 11, 2015).
88. S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Aftg. (Apr. 23, 2015).
89. Steve Benen, McConnells Silent Governing Failure, MSNBC (June 5, 2015)
http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/mcconnells-silent-governing-failure
[https://perna.cc/C4QH-M4RP]; Burgess Everett & Nick Gass, McConnell Vows to Slow Judicial
Nominees, POLITICO (June 5, 2015), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/06/mitch-mcconnell-
judicial-nominations-118674 [https://penna.cc/25PP-KK2J].
90. Alexander Bolton, McConnell Backs Away from Judicial Shutdown Talk, THE HLL (June
6, 2015), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/244196-mcconnell-backs-away-from-judicial-
shutdown-talk [https://perma.cc/Z22X-GYYG].
91. 161 CONG. REC. S3,849-50 (daily ed. June 8, 2015).
92. Leahy urged that the Senate had not approved a single judge since May. 161 CONG. REC.
S4,591-92 (daily ed. June 24, 2015); see 161 CONG. REC. S4,678 (daily ed. July 7, 2015) (Stoll
approval).
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mainstream nominee waited seven months on a committee hearing, 9 3
notably because Pat Toomey (R-Pa.) retained the blue slip. 94 He and Casey
urged elevation in a press release with Toomey declaring that Restrepo
would be a "superb addition to the Third Circuit." 95  The June hearing
proceeded smoothly; the nominee directly answered queries while Toomey
lavished consummate praise and the members appeared satisfied. 9 6  The
committee held over the nominee yet reported him. 97 After 420 days, the
Majority Leader provided a January 2016 chamber vote. 98
Obama eschewed nomination of 2015 aspirants when Republican
home state officers failed to collaborate, but he did proffer seven well
qualified, mainstream picks in 2016.99 Donald Schott and Jennifer
Klemetsrud Puhl realized summer panel ballots; 00 Judge Lucy Haeran
Koh's hearing was noticed then, and the committee approved her in
September.' 0 ' Yet, McConnell's 2015 perspective on circuit approvals
coupled with inaction left unclear whether they would earn appointment
because the Senate recessed to campaign in late September without voting
on anyone. Four additional nominees never received processing due to
93. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. For comparatively thorough treatment of Judge
Restrepo's confirmation process, see Carl Tobias, Confirming Judge Restrepo to the Third Circuit,
88 TEMPLE L. REv. ONLINE 37 (2017).
94. Bob Casey (D-Pa.) returned his blue slip on Nov. 14. Saranac Hale Spencer, Toomey
Sends Blue Slip, But Will Restrepo Get a Hearing?, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (May 19, 2015),
http://www.thelegalintelligencer.com/id=1202726785818?keywords=toomey&publication=The+L
egal+Intelligencer [https://perna.cc/FG9R-397L].
95. Sen. Robert Casey, Casey, Toomey Applaud Nomination ofJudge Luis Felipe Restrepo to
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, SENATE.GOV, (Nov. 12, 2014),
https://www.casey.senate.gov/newsroom/releases/casey-toomey-applaud-nomination-of-judge-luis
-felipe-restrepo-to-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-third-circuit [https://perna.cc/B8L5-27RH].
96. S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees (June 10, 2015); see Tracie Mauriello,
Toomey Signs Off on Nominee for Federal Appeals Court, PITT. POST-GAZETTE (May 14, 2015),
http://www.post-gazette.com/%/`201ocal/region/2015/05/14/Toomey-signs-off-on-nominee-for-
federal-appeals-court/stories/201%20505140325 [https://penna.cc/S8FM-8V65]; Spencer, supra
note 94.
97. S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Aftg. (July 9, 2015) (voice voting Restrepo without
dissent).
98. He won 95-0 approval. 162 CONG. REC. S21 (daily ed. Jan. 11, 2016).
99. Russell Wheeler, With Senate Control, Will the GOP Stop Confirming Circuit Court
Judges?, BROOKINGS INST. (June 10, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2015/06/10/
with-senate-control-will-the-gop-stop-confinning-circuit-court-judges/ [https://penna.cc/X8L7-
DPH].
100. S. Judiciary Comm., Hearings on Nominees (May 18, 2016); S. Judiciary Comm.,
Hearings on Nominees (June 23, 2016); S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Atg. (June 16, 2016);
S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Aftg. (July 14, 2016). The 7th Circuit's Donald Schott was
earlier than the 8th Circuit's Jennifer Klemetsrud Puhl.
101. S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees (July 13, 2016). The Ninth Circuit's Lucy
Haeran Koh earned panel approval in September. S. Judiciary Comm., Exec. Business Aftg. (Sept.
15, 2016).
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home-state politicians' retention of blue slips.1 02  This inaction persisted
over the lame duck session and the seven nominations finally expired on
January 3, 2017, which meant that the chamber approved the fewest circuit
jurists since 1897- 1898.103 Finally, Texas appellate openings lacked
designees, while national circuit activity inspired minimal confidence that
Republicans would allow chamber votes, had any pick been nominated.
III. Implications
The factors recounted mean that the bench experiences twenty circuit,
115 district court, and sixty emergency, vacancies, while Texas confronts
two appeals court, eleven district, and twelve emergency, openings. o0
Unoccupied posts ranged close to ninety in much of the five years after
September 2009 while the current 135 openings substantially exceed that
number; the courts were only able to experience fewer vacancies for a
somewhat brief period following the nuclear option's late 2013 detonation
which restricted filibusters. 0 5
Delayed appointments require that exceptional, moderate nominees
place their careers on hold and dissuade myriad impressive candidates from
even thinking about federal court service.' 0 6  Protracted review denies
tribunals the judicial resources which they desperately need; impedes swift,
economical, and fair case resolution; 0 7 imposes extreme pressure on
102. They were Third, Sixth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuit nominees Rebecca Ross
Haywood, Lisabeth Tabor Hughes, Myra Selby and Abdul Kallon. Blue Slip Report, ALLIANCE
FOR JUST. (Sept. 16, 2016, 8:41 AM), http://www.afj.org/our-work/judicial-selection/blue-slip-
report [https://penna.cc/M74Z-NKMA].
103. Christopher Kang, Republican Obstruction Could Be the Worst Record Since 1800s,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 20, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/christopher-kang/republican-
obstruction-of b_9741446.html [https://penna.cc/G7JG-U2CF] (the national system consisted of
25 circuit judges then rather than the current 179); Kim, supra note 33; 162 CONG. REC. S7,183
(daily ed. Jan. 3, 2017) (expiring nominations).
104. Judicial emergencies quintupled from twelve in January 2015. See supra notes 62, 82;
see also Bruce Moyer, August 2016: Judicial Vacancies Aove Toward Historic Levels, FED. B.
ASS'N (Aug. 2016), http://www.fedbar.org/Advocacy/Washington-Watch/WW-Archives/2016/
August-2016-Judicial-Vacancies-Move-Toward-Historic-Levels-.aspx [https://perma.cc/S6F5-
3DUL] (attributing ten vacancies in the preceding two years largely to Texas senators' delay in
sending Obama names); Joe Palazzolo, In Federal Courts, the Civil Cases Pile Up, WALL STREET
J. (Apr. 6, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/in-federal-courts-civil-cases-pile-up-1428343746
[https://penna.cc/XTN4-J3U5].
105. See supra notes 34, 42-43 and accompanying text.
106. Jennifer Bendery, Federal Judges Are Burned Out, Overworked and Wondering Where
Congress Is, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/judge-
federal-courts-vacancies us_55d77721e4bOa4Oaa3aafl4b [https://penna.cc/H275-CQBB];
Andrew Cohen, In Pennsylvania, the Human Costs of Judicial Confirmation Delays, ATLANTIC
(Sept. 9, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/09/in-pennsylvania-the-human-
costs-of-judicial-confinnation-delays/261862/ [https://perna.cc/EYR9-CYQP].
107. Gabrielle Banks, Texas Leads Nation in Federal Judicial Vacancies, HOUS. CHRON.
(Dec. 20, 2016), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Texas-
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increasingly overworked jurists; 08 and makes litigants waste years seeking
civil trials and pursuing settlements.1 09 These deleterious consequences
also undercut citizen regard for the selection process and the coequal
government branches." 0
Texas addresses dire circumstances. Vacancies' sheer quantity and
lengthy nature have exacted a toll. The prolonged Fifth Circuit openings
limit the state's representation by active judges, intensify problems that the
court's other jurists encounter, and clearly slow appeals. Burgeoning
criminal and immigration cases require that many district judges
prodigiously labor nights and weekends. This complicates efforts to set
firm trial dates for pending civil actions, conduct trials, and reach
settlements, which concomitantly means that a plethora of Texas
individuals and corporations wait forever on trials and suits' disposition."'
Those predicaments can force jurists to become senior judges at the earliest
time or retire, depriving the courts of invaluable experience and resources,
in particular which compensate for attenuated vacancies, while even
necessitating that the Texas district courts import jurists from districts
which are outside Texas.11 2 Empty judgeships created so many problems
that Texas industries established a group which lobbies the officials to fill
numbers of seats. 113
leads-nation-in-federal-judicial-vacancies-10810025.php; Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller,
Criminal Case Glut Impedes Civil Suits, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424052970204505304577001771159867642 [https://perma.
cc/C2NE-PRLV].
108. JOHN ROBERTS, YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 7-8 (2010); see John
Council, The Slowpoke Report: Vacancies, Crushing Caseload Take Toll on Texas Bench, TEX.
LAW. (Feb. 1, 2017), http://www.texaslawyer.com/id=1202776937994/The-Slowpoke-Report-
Vacancies-Crushing-Caseloads-Take-Toll-on-Texas-Bench?slreturn=20170311120428 [https://
perma.cc/6D9C-SJMP]; Wheeler, supra note 99.
109. Tobias, supra note 28, at 2253; Banks, supra note 107.
110. Shira A. Scheindlin, America's Trial Court Judges: Our Front Line for Justice, N.Y.
TIMES (May 6, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/07/opinion/americas-trial-court-judges-
our-front-line-for-justice.html [https://perma.cc/D2PA-U3YQ]; see supra notes 107, 109 and
accompanying text.
111. Alliance for Justice, supra note 21; Jazmine Ulloa, Texas Federal Judges Sound Alarm
Over Empty Judicial Posts, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN (June 15, 2014, 8:13 PM), http://www.
mystatesman.com/news/news/crime-law/texas-federal-judges-sound-alarn-over-empty-
judici/ngLrR/#5c8ceeao.257301.735400 [https://perma.cc/KK8J-DKKH]; see Cohen, supra note
56 (explaining how the Texas senators were failing to discharge their constitutional responsibility
for insuring that the judiciary meets citizen needs); Moyer, supra note 104 (explaining that three
of the four Texas districts rank among the top ten courts with the most substantial workloads).
112. S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees (July 13, 2016) (statement of Judge Reeves);
Council, supra note 63; Cindy George, Judgeship Vacancies Translate into Delays, HOUS.
CHRON. (June 27, 2015, 9:42 PM), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/houston/
article/Judgeship-vacancies-translate-into-delaysHouston-63 53 862.php [https://perna.cc/Y2QD-
RNNG]; see infra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
113. Kevin Diaz, Congress Slow to Fill Federal Bench in Texas, HOUS. CHRON. (Jan. 26,
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IV. Suggestions For The Future
The White House and Texas politicians should cooperate in each phase
of the process to solve the acute vacancy crisis. All lawmakers ought to
follow regular order by using practices that will streamline the procedures,
installing excellent, centrist designees in the abundant, escalating open
slots. 4 Comyn-the Assistant Majority Leader, who correspondingly has
panel seniority-is uniquely positioned to expedite nominations and
confirmations.
The administration must assertively consult Texas officers because the
jurisdiction experiences numerous lengthy vacancies and more than a fifth
of the emergency openings nationwide. The politicians should augment
collaboration by more promptly affording strong, consensus prospects." 5
The FJEC, which solicits, evaluates, interviews and recommends choices,
has been helpful, yet the panel and the officials have worked slowly. 6 The
two Fifth Circuit, and large number of district, openings could result from
the commission pace or the senators' failure to activate the panel swiftly." 7
Thus, the commission as well as Senate and House members can explore
diverse, promising models, namely the Wisconsin and California initiatives
that functioned well across Bush's years, while recalibrating endeavors to
speedily propose submissions." For instance, the politicians should move
quickly when empty posts surface or diligently predict them.119 The
legislators need to start commission processes quickly once jurists indicate
that they may become senior judges or retire and efficiently proffer
suggestions.1 20  Quite a few jurists provide notice when they decide, but
others could be more timely. 121 Related helpful notions are proposing
2015, 9:17PM), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Congress-
slow-to-fill-federal-bench-in-Texas-60363 3 9.php [https://penna.cc/3C2Q-3Y4Z].
114. For numerous specific recommendations for improving the selection process, see
Michael Shenkman, Decoupling District from Circuit Judge Nominations: A Proposal to Put Trial
Bench Confirmations on Track, 65 ARK. L. REV. 217, 298-311 (2012); Tobias, supra note 28, at
2255-66. Senators must at least apply the customs employed during Bush's years.
115. See supra notes 25, 40, 45, 48 and accompanying text.
116. The politicians have considerably greater responsibility. Council, supra note 38; Knight,
supra note 25.
117. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
118. Disparities in Texas judicial appointments during the Bush and Obama years show that
Cornyn can expedite processes and the FJEC can move quickly. Tobias, supra note 28, at 2256.
But see Craig Gilbert, Wisconsin Seat on U.S. Appeals Court Remains a Symbol of Partisan
Judicial Wars, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL (Aug. 14, 2017), http://www.jsonline.com/story/
news/politics/2017/08/14/now-they-power-repblican/56080300 1/ [https://penna.cc/2HL9-E5YR]
(suggesting that the Wisconsin panel may have operated less smoothly recently); Grunwald, supra
note 48 (same).
119. Tobias, supra note 28, at 2256; see supra notes 45, 62 and accompanying text.
120. Knight, supra note 25.
121. Senators may even respectfully ask those eligible to notify them soon after deciding. 28
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several designees and identifying preferences, which can enlarge White
House flexibility and minimize the necessity to reopen the selection
122process.
A valuable solution for circuit vacancies is elevating district judges, as
the chamber approved them initially while the jurists have compiled much
experience and comprehensive, accessible records. The construct would
help fill both Texas openings, because its lawmakers asked that Judge
Costa, who easily won appointment, be promoted, while they suggested
plentiful selections for the trial courts, notably District Judges Marmolejo
and Saldafia, who deserve consideration.1 23
A related productive device would be renominating able, consensus
nominees, specifically the five 2016 Texas aspirants who enjoyed hearings
last year. Comyn and Cruz previously submitted and powerfully supported
the prominent, mainstream designees, their renominations would speed
confirmation and preserve resources and the Texas courts desperately need
more judges. 2 4
In the unlikely event that Texas legislators appear unresponsive to
White House overtures by tendering no candidates or acting too slowly,1 25
the President might nominate without their support. Obama rarely did that
until 2016 for multiple circuit picks, albeit not Texas.1 26 This strategy may
U.S.C. § 371 (2006); see George, supra note 112. I am not suggesting that Presidents, senators or
judicial colleagues pressure jurists about status changes. Judges must be completely free to make
this critical professional and personal decision.
122. This occurs if the White House disagrees with one pick sent. Senators whose party lacks
the presidency may send one. E.g., Joseph Morton, Obama Names Omaha Attorney Rossiter to
Federal Bench in Nebraska, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (June 12, 2015), http://www.omaha.com/
news/crime/obama-nominates-omaha-attorney-rossiter-to-federal-bench-in-nebraska/article_
7517dc5c-1084-11e5-9f03-eb447e9aaa07.html [https://penna.cc/SFW7-U2SJ]. But see Tobias,
supra note 28, at 2251.
123. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. Senators Hutchinson and Cornyn
recommended and supported both judges who captured 2011 confirmation. Trump reportedly
asked the FJEC to evaluate Texas District Judge Reed O'Connor for possible elevation. See
sources cited infra note 158.
124. The nominees had ABA evaluations and strong ratings, comprehensive FBI background
checks, thorough panel investigations and comprehensive hearings in which Cornyn and Cruz
lavished praise on the nominees and in which members appeared satisfied, while they only need
panel discussions and votes and floor debates and chamber ballots. See infra notes 135-45 and
accompanying text (analyzing 5 nominees' hearing and post-hearing treatment); Kevin Diaz,
Texas is Ground Zero As Trump Steers the Federal Judiciary to the Right, HOUS. CHRON. (Aug.
12, 2017), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Texas-is-Ground
-Zero-as-Trump-steers-the-federal-1 1807743.php [https://perma.cc/WAP2-H5VM] (suggesting
that few analysts believe the Texas senators will recommend that Trump renominate the 5
nominees, because "they have the taint of being 'consensus' candidates officially nominated by
Obama"); see also infra note 163 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 36-38, 44-45 and accompanying text.
126. It is unclear why Obama eschewed nominating 2016 Texas Circuit prospects, as Obama
considered district judges when he elevated Costa. Contreras, supra note 39; John Council, Then
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lack efficacy, which could indicate why he eschewed naming Texans for the
Fifth Circuit vacancies.1 27
The administration can also pursue more drastic constructs, which are
probably not warranted today, because the same party controls the White
House and the Senate. For instance, Trump could nominate
recommendations for all vacancies or from places other than states where
circuit openings arise-which can dramatize and publicize how chronic
vacancies erode justice-or advocate "trades," a concept which Obama
purportedly used to fill six protracted Georgia open slots.1 28
The White House should expedite initiatives before and when Texas
politicians send choices. For example, the administration could grant
nominations significantly higher priority and greater resources.1 29 It may
carefully facilitate ABA and FBI consideration and White House
evaluations and nominations while urging much swifter chamber
analyses. 30 Once the President forwards nominees, Texas senators must
promptly deliver their blue slips. Indeed, no persuasive reason explains
why Comyn and Cruz delayed returning their blue slips plenty of weeks
after Obama tapped the five March 2016 nominees or why Grassley did not
arrange their hearing until after the protracted summer recess.13
There Were Three, TEX. LAW. (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.texaslawyer.com/id=1202630936066?
keywords=then+there+were+three&publication=Texas+Lawyer.
127. If home-state senators retain blue slips, processing halts. See supra notes 29, 57, 105
and accompanying text.
128. For trades, see Daniel Malloy, The Delegation Georgians in D.C.; Woodall Does
Balancing Act in House GOP Post, ATLANTA J.- CONST., July 20, 2014, at 14A; see also Tobias,
supra note 28, at 2261; Ben Kamisar, Obama Names Three Texas Judges in Apparent Deal with
Cornyn and Cruz, DALL. MORNING NEWS (June 26, 2014, 6:20PM)
http://trailblazersblog.dallasnews.com/2014/06/obama-names-three-texas-judges-in-apparent-deal-
with-cornyn-and-cruz.html/ [https://perna.cc/4U6V-3UT7]; Carl Tobias, Filling the Fourth
Circuit Vacancies, 89 N.C. L. REv. 2161, 2195-96 (2011) (out of state nominee idea); David Lat,
Circuit Court Nominees in the Trump Administration (Part ) 11-12, ABOVE THE LAW (July 21,
2017), http://abovethelaw.com/2017/07/circuit-court-nominees-in-the-trump-administration-the-
latest-news-and-rumor-part-1/ [https://perma.cc/A9MJ-S73S] (raising the possibility of Trump
nominating a Texan to vacancies that arise in Louisiana or Mississippi, the other two states that
comprise the Fifth Circuit, but criticizing the prospect as inadvisable). The White House may also
compromise on the type of nominees whom it prefers.
129. Goldmanetal., supra note 28, at 11-13; Tobias, supra note 28, at 2250-51.
130. Tobias, supra note 28, at 2235; see also S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees (July
13, 2016). But see MLLER CTR. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 3; Tobias, supra note 3, at
1270.
131. ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 105; Jennifer Bendery, Republicans Aren't Even
Pretending They Want to Confirm Judges Anymore, HUFFINGTON POST (June 28, 2016, 3:43 PM)
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/senate-republicans-obama-judges us_
576426b6e4b0853f8bf0a4fa [https://perna.cc/7JYH-K7JM]; see John Council, Obama Still Has
Shot to Fill Half of Texas' U.S. Judicial Vacancies, TEX. LAW. (July 20, 2016),
http://www.texaslawyer.com/id=1202763156686/Obama-Still-Has-Shot-to-Fill-Half-of-Texas-
US-Judicial-Vacancies [https://perma.cc/WCM6-UPKK]; see Michael Macagnone, Texas Federal
Judge Hopefuls Face Senate Questioning, LAW 360 (Sept. 7, 2016), http://www.law360.com/
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The Texas politicians should prevail on Grassley to convene hearings
for more nominees while scheduling faster panel discussions and committee
votes, specifically for the 2016 aspirants, if Trump renominates them.132
The chair might explore productive ideas for speedy assessment. A
constructive notion, which Hatch employed as chair in Bush's presidency,
was abbreviated hearings for talented, mainstream nominees.133 Recent
examples were sessions for the Texas district nominees confirmed during
2015 and Restrepo, which constituted an hour of copious pointed queries
and complete, direct responses.134
Grassley finally arranged the hearing on the March 2016 nominees in
September following the chamber's return from the summer recess.1 35 He
asked that Comyn serve as chair of the hearing. Comyn introduced the five
prospects, stated that the Evaluation Commission had powerfully
recommended the selections, praised their qualifications, and observed that
cooperative action with the chief executive had persuaded Obama to
nominate them.1 3 6 Cruz similarly lauded the candidates and called for their
prompt appointment. 13 7  The session progressed smoothly and members
appeared satisfied with the nominees' responses to questions.138
At the hearing's conclusion, Comyn announced that the record would
articles/836727/texas-federal-judge-hopefuls-face-senate-questioning [https://perna.cc/3YEU-
EAC5] (contending that Senator "Cruz had not submitted a 'blue slip' in time for the committee to
proceed before the summer recess").
132. See S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees (July 13, 2016) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
(holding hearings and approving 10 Bush district nominees in Sept. 2008). But see supra note 69
and accompanying text. The prospects for renomination of the five Texas nominees are
unfavorable, even though Trump has renominated three Obama district court nominees and is
seriously considering renominating more. See supra note 124; infra note 166. Cornyn as a senior
panel member and the Assistant Majority Leader can prevail on Grassley, who should be
receptive, given Texas's urgent need.
133. Tobias, supra note 28, at 2263.
134. S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees (June 10, 2015); S. Judiciary Comm.,
Hearing on Nominees (Jan. 21, 2015).
135. S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees (Sept. 7, 2016); see Diaz, supra note 124
(suggesting that Grassley's September scheduling of the hearing contravened a "long-standing
Senate rule against late-election confirmation hearings [,and] the hearing was timed, some
Democrats believed, as insurance against a victory by Hillary Clinton, who was then ahead in the
polls"); Mario Recio, Texas Nominees for 'Outrageous' Judge Vacancies Get Senate Hearing,
MCCLATCHYDC.COM, Sept. 7, 2016.
136. Hearing, supra note 135; see Jordan Rudner, 5 Texas Judge Nominees Have Broad
Support But Won't Be Confirmed Anytime Soon, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Sept. 7, 2016),
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/courts/2016/09/07/five-texas-judge-nominees-broad-support-
confirned-anytime-soon [https://perna.cc/37L5-8C8J].
137. Hearing, supra note 135; see Jamie Lovegrove, White House Blasts Cruz, Cornyn for
Pushing Texas Judges While Blocking Supreme Court Nominee, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Sept.
16, 2016), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/2016/09/16/white-house-tangles-cruz-
cornyn-judges [https://penna.cc/T6PP-2WPT].
138. Hearing, supra note 135; see Rudner, supra note 136.
[Vol. 95:170190
Essay
remain open for one week, so that members could submit written queries.139
Senator Grassley asked all five nominees the same eighteen questions, most
of which pertained to case management and the role of precedent.1 40
Senator Thom Tillis (R-N.C.) concomitantly asked each nominee ten
identical questions, most of which related to constitutional interpretation
and the First, Second, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.' 4 ' All five of
the nominees swiftly responded to the queries, and the nominee responses
were clear and comprehensive.1 42
Throughout the hearing, Comyn emphasized the desperate
circumstances in Texas and promised that the nominees would receive swift
affirmative or negative floor ballots.1 43 Despite Comyn's pledges that the
chamber would promptly supply final votes on the five nominees, and even
though regular order typically dictated that the panel would convene
executive business meetings every Thursday that the Senate worked,
Grassley neglected to conduct executive business meetings on September
22 or 29. '4 This meant that the five nominees could not have committee
discussions and ballots until the Senate returned in mid-November after the
elections. The chair should have arranged a meeting promptly after the
Senate convened and not held over the discussions and votes for several
important reasons. 1 The nominees had waited over three months since
their hearing, comparatively little time remained in that congressional
session and routinely delaying panel discussions and ballots, particularly for
nominees to emergency vacancies, was unwarranted. The Senate met for
plentiful weeks over the lame duck session, yet Grassley never chose to
arrange a vote. Thus, the five 2016 Texas district prospects' nominations
expired on January 3, 2017.46
The Majority Leader should increase rigorous chamber debates and
votes, because considering only one nominee every month in President
Obama's last two years eviscerated justice, namely in Texas, which
139. Hearing, supra note 135.
140. Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator Chuck Grassley (Sept. 2016).
141. Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator Thomas Tillis (Sept. 2016).
142. Responses of David Counts III, E. Scott Frost, James Wesley Hendrix, Inna Carrillo
Ramirez and Karen Gren Scholer to Questions for the Record Submitted by Senators Charles
Grassley and Thomas Tillis (Sept. 2016).
143. Hearing, supra note 135; see Council, supra note 36; Lovegrove, supra note 137; Recio,
supra note 135.
144. See Hearings & Meetings, S. JUDICLARY COMM., https://www.judiciary.senate.gov
/hearings [https://penna.cc/W638-JWCQ] (showing that no executive meetings took place on
September 22 or 29).
145. Grassley held over votes on all Texas nominees; most were for emergencies, like the
March 2016 picks. Archive of Judicial Vacancies, supra note 5; supra notes 71-73 and
accompanying text (not holding over very few, including two Iowa nominees).
146. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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addresses twelve emergency vacancies. For instance, McConnell needs to
reinstitute a custom from President Bush's time, giving each competent,
moderate district suggestion on the floor a vote near long recesses, 4 7 and to
clarify the current Republican view on supplying appellate choices final
ballots, because approving a minuscule number over a White House's last
half term was unprecedented. He ought to cooperate with Assistant
Majority Leader Comyn, who is perfectly situated for applying pressure, if
warranted, to confirm numerous Texas aspirants.
Because the GOP continued obstruction, the Obama Administration
might have deployed, but failed to use, rather drastic tools. For example,
the White House could have relied on the bully pulpit when holding
numbers of lawmakers accountable, taken selection to the people or
considered open seats an election issue. 149  The chief executive and
legislators could have dramatically altered the process through structuring a
bipartisan judiciary in which the party that lacks the White House can
tender specific percentages of recommendations, a solution which the
Pennsylvania senators adopted and continue employing. 5 0  Texas might
have applied this for district vacancies.' 5 ' Some of these mechanisms could
have been packaged with a judgeships law which became effective over
2017, so that neither party would reap unfair advantage but this did not
happen. 152 The 114th Congress eschewed a thorough measure, although the
147. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
148. Texas's desperate straits could have supported leapfrogging the 2016 picks, a
phenomenon witnessed in Grassley's orchestrating rapid confirmation of two Iowans. See Archive
ofJudicial Vacancies, supra note 5; supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text (holding over four
2015 re-nominees whom Republican home-state senators recommended).
149. Illustrative is shaming politicians who send no picks. David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott,
Navigating the New Politics ofJudicialAppointments, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1869, 1902-06 (2008);
Tobias, supra note 28, at 2261.
150. Michael Gerhardt, Judicial Selection as War, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 667, 688 (2003);
Carl Tobias, Fixing the Federal Judicial Selection Process, 65 EMORY L.J. ONLINE 2051, 2056-
58 (2016). The senator whose party does not control the White House recommends one in every
four district candidates. PA Judge Luis Restrepo Confirmed to Federal Appeals Court,
PENNSYLVANIANS FOR MOD. CTS., http://pmconline.org/node/450 [https://penna.cc/7KTJ-
LKY8]; Press Release, Bob Casey and Pat Toomey, U.S. Senators for Pennsylvania, Senators
Casey and Toomey Continue Bipartisan Agreement on District Court Vacancies, Mar. 10, 2017.
This suggestion could be instituted in particular states or nationally.
151. Texas officers might have chosen one in four. See Tobias, supra note 150. Texas
senators' lack of cooperation effectively instituted bipartisan courts. Most Presidents assume the
lead on making appellate nominations because circuits comprise multiple states (thus diluting
senatorial courtesy somewhat), while circuit opinions govern them and set more policy.
Shenkman, supra note 114, at 226-28; Tobias, supra note 28, at 2240.
152. Tobias, supra note 150, at 2057-58; see Tobias, supra note 42, at 140; see supra note 76
and accompanying text. Although passage of thorough judgeships legislation seemed unrealistic
after the 2016 elections, Republicans' capture of the presidency, the Senate and the House of
Representatives could actually make passage more realistic, especially if both parties initiate a
bipartisan judiciary. More judgeships will not remedy the judicial vacancy crisis, if the Senate
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new Congress should adopt a comprehensive bill or at least pass "border"
legislation to alleviate crushing Texas dockets.'53
Finally, selection participants need to assess comprehensive ways of
ending or ameliorating the confirmation wars in which Texas apparently
comprises the epicenter. It will be essential to terminate or at least slow the
incessant, vicious cycle of paybacks and strident, counterproductive
politicization epitomized in Republican and Democratic rhetoric and
concomitant actions that were on full display in the recent confirmation
process for Justice Neil Gorsuch.
V. A Post-Election Postscript
It remains unclear what the elections of President Donald Trump and a
52-48 GOP Senate majority portend for the Texas judicial vacancy crisis.
The significant need for privacy of the candidates, the Texas senators and
the President may explain this lack of clarity. Nevertheless, some relevant
information exists.
Trump's highest priority has been establishing a government. Insofar
as there was time for court appointments, filling the Supreme Court opening
demanded much effort. Limited information exists regarding lower court
appointments partly because Justice Scalia's vacancy preoccupied many
salient participants; the White House and Justice Department, which have
lead responsibility, fulfilled other critical duties; and home state politicians
have been helping to create a new government and may have been waiting
on the chief executive.
However, considerable information regarding administration lower
court endeavors is available generally and on Texas specifically. 5 4  The
chief executive has been applying certain measures that prior
administrations deployed. For instance, the White House Counsel has
assumed substantial responsibility for nominations, especially to appeals
courts, and has been diligently cooperating on recommendations with
cannot confirm nominees.
153. S.1014, 112th Cong. (2011). A comprehensive immigration reform bill amendment that
would have authorized additional judgeships for border jurisdictions passed the Senate in 2013.
S.744, 113th Cong. (2013); Martin, supra note 37.
154. I rely substantially in this paragraph on Shane Goldmacher, Trump's Hidden Back
Channel to Justice Kennedy: Their Kids, POLITICO (Apr. 6, 2017),
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/04/donald-trump-supreme-court-236925
[https://perna.cc/8HZ2-GSC2]; Eric Lipton & Jeremy Peters, In Gorsuch, Conservative Activists
See Test for Reshaping the Judiciary, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/20 17/03/18/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-court-
conservatives.html?_r-0 [https://perma.cc/9PEL-DHZL]; Zoe Tillman, Why Trump Will Have to
Work With the Senate, Including Democrats, To Get His Judges Confirmed, BUZZFEED NEWS
(Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.buzzfeed.com/zoetillman/why-trump-will-have-to-work-with-
democrats-to-get-his?utm term-.ksdWL7nXq#.ouGlwv7QE [https://penna.cc/A24G-CN34].
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politicians in states that presently have vacancies. '5 5 The Federalist Society
has concomitantly been advising Trump, particularly on circuit openings.
Nonetheless, the administration has clearly eschewed pre-nomination
dependence on American Bar Association investigations and ratings, which
sharply contrasts to all Presidents since Dwight Eisenhower except George
W. Bush. 5 7 Since April when the Senate confirmed Judge Neil Gorsuch to
the U.S. Supreme Court, the White House has been devoting more
resources to lower court nominations. 5 8
Some pertinent administration effort has directly involved the empty
Texas Fifth Circuit seats. A few press outlets stated that the President
requested the FJEC to analyze six circuit aspirants, while the commission
apparently evaluated the choices during February and March and finished
making suggestions to Comyn and Cruz in April.1 59 Conservative political
views are the foremost characteristic that seems to unite those six appellate
155. Tillman, supra note 154; see Tobias, supra note 28, at 2240-41. For appellate
candidates, one major focus has been youth. Goldmacher, supra note 154; Alex Swoyer,
Conservatives Urge Trump to Use Slew of Court Vacancies to Reshape Legal System, WASH.
TIMES (Apr. 9, 2017), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/apr/9/neil-gorsuch-
confirmation-clears-donald-trump-to-r/ [https://perma.cc/2Y8U-MUBB].
156. Lipton & Peters, supra note 154; Philip Rucker & Robert Barnes, Trump to Inherit More
than 100 Court Vacancies, Plans to Reshape Judiciary, WASH. POST (Dec. 25, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-to-inherit-more-than-100-court-vacancies-plans-
to-reshape-judiciary/2016/12/25/dl90ddl8-c928-1 1e6-85b5-76616a33048dstory.html
[https://perna.cc/G7EG-7PHJ]; see Jeffrey Toobin, The Conservative Pipeline to the Supreme
Court, NEW YORKER (Apr. 17, 2017), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/04/17/the-
conservative-pipeline-to-the-supreme-court [https://penna.cc/9EHA-9348]; Jason DeParle,
Debating the Subtle Sway of the Federalist Society, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/01/politics/politicsspeciall/debating-the-subtle-sway-of-the-
federalist.html [https://perma.cc/52KY-A3DW].
157. This is unwise, because the ABA evaluations and ratings are very professional, offer
valuable insights and can save the candidates and the administration from embarrassment, should
problematic revelations arise later in the process. The White House may also want to remember
that the ABA accorded Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justices Samuel Alito and Neil
Gorsuch its highest rating. Noah Feldman, White House Ends Bar Association 's Role in Vetting
Judges, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Apr. 2, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-04-
03/gorsuch-may-be-trump-s-last-well-qualified-judge [https://perna.cc/V9Q8-X3MA]; Adam
Liptak, White House Cuts ABA Out of Judge Evaluations, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/3 1/us/politics/white-house-american-bar-association-
judges.html [https://perma.cc/LYS3-KZEP].
158. Adam Liptak & Matt Flegenheimer, Court Nominee Confirmed After Bruising Yearlong
Effort, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-
supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/G5UP-G7PA]; see sources cited supra note 154.
159. John Council, 6 Candidates Trump Wants to Place on the Fifth Circuit Set for Vetting,
TEX. LAWYER (Feb. 14, 2017), http://www.texaslawyer.com/id= 1202779124278/6-Candidates-
Trump-Wants-to-Place-on-the-Fifth-Circuit-Set-for-Vetting?slreturn=20170229154845
[https://perna.cc/N8P8-6SDA]; Diaz, supra note 124; Ken Klukowski, Texas Republicans Hail
Judicial Hopefuls to Fulfill Trump Promise, BREITBART (Feb. 23, 2017),
http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2017/02/23/exclusive-texas-republicans-hail-judicial-
hopefuls-fulfill-trump-promise/ [https://penna.cc/C3JH-EVDK]; see supra note 25.
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court prospects. 6 0 Because the two vacancies are protracted and classified
as emergencies, they deserve considerable priority.' 6 '
If Trump actually requested that the commission assess the six
prospects, Comyn and Cruz ought to have accorded some deference to the
President respecting those candidates.1 6 2  The senators might have
augmented the "Trump List" with other excellent choices, depending on the
FJEC views of the six plus additional prospects whom it considered and the
senators' perspectives on all of the candidates. After Cornyn and Cruz
reached agreement, they should have proffered their suggestions to the
White House with a few picks for each open seat and reasons for
prioritization. The White House in turn must carefully evaluate the
recommendations and negotiate with the senators, if merited, and nominate
two highly competent, mainstream nominees.
Comyn and Cruz appear to have made a promising start on filling the
district vacancies. For example, they issued a January press release which
sought candidate applications by February 19.163 The commission
concomitantly thoroughly surveyed the applications, examined the data
conveyed, interviewed numerous candidates, and tendered proposals to
160. See Council, supra note 159; Klukowski, supra note 159.
161. This is even more compelling because there is a third emergency Fifth Circuit vacancy in
Louisiana. Judicial Emergencies, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-
vacancies/judicial-emergencies [https://perma.cc/N2EC-WMNA] (last visited Apr. 11, 2017).
Recent reports suggest that there are four stronger contenders for the two vacancies but that
resolution of who will receive nomination will happen soon, perhaps in September upon the
Senate's return from the August recess. Multiple observers believe that the frontrunner for one
vacancy is Northern District Judge Reed O'Connor, who served as a Comyn aide. The remaining
three candidates are James Ho, who is co-chair of Gibson Dunn's appellate practice and former
Texas Solicitor General and is said to be a Cruz favorite; Andy Oldham, who is Texas Governor
Greg Abbott's Deputy General Counsel, and is said to be Abbott's favorite; and Texas Supreme
Court Justice Don Willett, who has served on the court since 2005, worked for Abbott when he
was Texas Attorney General and was on Trump's short list of twenty preferences for the U.S.
Supreme Court vacancy. See Lat, supra note 128, at 11; David Lat, Federal Judicial
Nominations: A Quick Recap 3, ABOVE THE LAW (Aug. 17, 2017), http://abovethelaw.com/2017/
08/federal-judicial-nominations-a-quick-recap/; Maria Recio, Greg Abbott Plays an Outsized Role
in Filling U.S. Judicial Vacancies, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN (May 14, 2017),
http://www.mystatesman.com/news/state--regional-govt--politics/greg-abbott-plays-outsized-role-
filling-judicial-vacancies/eObLMmLxHxMtCcrUibrmML/ [https://penna.cc/N9X7-82SJ].
162. Presidents customarily assume the lead on circuit nominations. Tobias, supra note 28, at
2240-41.
163. Press Release, Cornyn, Cruz Announce Application Process for Texas Judgeships (Jan.
23, 2017). Comyn stated: "It's a new administration. It's not as if these [five nominees] will not
have the opportunity to compete." He added that "some may reapply and blamed the Obama
administration for not making filling the positions a priority." Maria Recio, Cruz, Cornyn Slow-
Play Texas Judicial Vacancies After Trump Election, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN (Feb. 17, 2017),
http://www.mystatesman.com/news/state--regional-govt--politics/cruz-comyn-slow-play-texas-
judicial-vacancies-after-trump-election/ETwhHdMR4BzypVRHtvRmjJ/ [https://perna.cc/VHU2-
KNN3]; see supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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Cornyn and Cruz in April.16 4  The politicians apparently promptly and
cautiously scrutinized these people and directly forwarded
recommendations to the White House with several prospects for every
vacancy and comprehensive explanations for their rankings.
Comyn and Cruz must have seriously considered proposing the
renomination of the five 2016 district nominees who secured hearings last
year for the above-documented reasons. For instance, both politicians had
earlier recommended and supported the nominees, the designees'
renomination would directly expedite confirmation and conserve resources
and the Texas districts have critical needs for more judges. '6 5  The
nominees have also undertaken career and personal sacrifices and have
waited protracted times, while they did not receive confirmation for
political reasons unrelated to their qualifications, which are excellent.
Thus, fairness concerns suggest that the nominees deserve much
consideration.
After Comyn and Cruz tender proposals, the White House needs to
carefully and promptly scrutinize them. President Trump must also
seriously contemplate renominating some or all of the five well qualified,
mainstream 2016 nominees for the reasons discussed above. 6 6
Once the White House makes nominations for any of the twelve Texas
circuit and district emergency vacancies and the one non-emergency
opening, the President ought to cooperate with the Senate to assure prompt,
comprehensive and fair confirmation processes. The Texas senators must
assiduously cultivate all of their colleagues on the committee and in the
chamber and educate them regarding the nominees' qualifications. The
members correspondingly need to insure expeditious, thorough and fair
164. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 124, 135-45 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 164. President Trump has already renominated 3 Obama nominees,
including District of Idaho Judge David Nye, who was the first Trump district court nominee to
capture appointment. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y, President Donald J.
Trump Announces Judicial Candidate Nominations (May 8, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2017/05/08/president-donald-j -trump-announces-judicial-candidate-nominations
[https://penna.cc/NE6Z-3DTB]; 163 CONG. REC. S3,935 (daily ed. July 12, 2017). The President
is also seriously considering the renomination of three additional Obama nominees. See, e.g.,
David Lat, The Art of the Possible: New York Nominees for Federal Judgeships and Prosecutor
Posts, ABOVE THE LAW (Aug. 8, 2017), http://abovethelaw.com/2017/08/the-art-of-the-possible-
new-york-nominees-for-federal-judgeships-and-prosecutor-posts/ [https://penna.cc/8RSA-VKLJ];
Andrew Seidman & Jonathan Tamari, Trump Poised to Nominate Christie Ally for U.S. Attorney
in Complex Political Deal, PHILA. INQUIRER (Aug. 10, 2017), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/
politics/presidential/trump-poised-to-nominate-christie-ally-for-u-s-attorney-post-20 1708 10.html
[https://perma.cc/E2LC-6UBH]; Zoe Tillman, The White House Has Pitched Nominee for
Manhattan's Powerful U.S. Attorney Opening, BUZZFEED NEWS (Aug. 7, 2017),
https://www.buzzfeed.com/zoetillman/the-white-house-has-pitched-a-nominee-for-
manhattans?utm term=.ybxjZ9n9R#.veAW8pep3 [https://perma.cc/UF6R-M3FY].
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consideration at the panel stage and on the chamber floor. 6 7
VI. Conclusion
Modem appointments, concretely illustrated by obstruction and
procedural technicalities' employment to stall consideration, detrimentally
affect federal court jurists and litigants. The vacancy crisis has profound
implications for Texas. The state addresses two circuit, eleven district, and
twelve emergency, openings, while a perfect solution has not been crafted.
Thus, the White House and the Texas legislators must redouble their efforts
to collaborate throughout the nomination and confirmation processes by
swiftly filling the open positions with able, mainstream jurists, who could
afford the justice that numerous Texas citizens and corporations merit.
Senators' delay and neglect of their constitutional advise-and-consent
responsibilities have eroded attempts by the coequal judicial branch to
fulfill its duties, especially to promptly, inexpensively and equitably resolve
disputes in Texas. Accordingly, the White House, the chamber, and
politicians must reject striking partisanship, slowdowns, and paybacks.
Only then can Texas jurists better deliver justice for individuals and
businesses litigating in federal courts.
167. See supra notes 132-34, 146-47 and accompanying text.
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